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Abstract
I investigate the impact of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on fuel
efficiency of fossil fuel power plants using administrative micro data on power plants in Germany
from 2003 to 2012. I find positive efficiency effects in fuel use, leading to a decrease in fuel input
of 0.4 percent for an increase in carbon cost of one Euro. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that the reduction in fuel use by fossil fuel power plants due to the introduction of the
EU ETS translates into reductions in annual carbon emissions within the German electricity sector
by around seven million tonnes in 2012. This represents about 2.4 percent of total annual carbon
emissions in the German electricity sector and exemplifies the potential magnitude of efficiency
improvements as a measure for reducing carbon emissions.
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1. Introduction
The energy sector is central to climate protection strategies in several countries including Ger-
many, where it accounts for around 40 percent of total annual carbon emissions. The Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that “[d]ecarbonizing (i.e. reducing the carbon
intensity of) electricity generation is a key component of cost-effective mitigation strategies [...]”
(IPCC, 2014). Hence, understanding the effects of existing climate policies on the energy sector is
crucial for the further development of policies to achieve mitigation targets efficiently.
In this study, I investigate the impact of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS) on fuel efficiency of fossil fuel power plants in Germany. Furthermore, I analyse potential
effects on labour efficiency, investments in machinery and utilization of power plants. The EU
ETS is currently the largest cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. It puts
a price on greenhouse gas emissions from regulated installations to achieve emission reductions
and to provide incentives for investments in low-carbon technologies. As the EU ETS covers
multiple sectors, emission reduction efforts within the energy sector will only be undertaken if
(marginal) abatement costs are relatively low compared to activities in other regulated sectors
and lower than the (expected) market price of emission allowances. Fuel switching, i.e. generating
electricity with fuels that are associated with lower (including zero) carbon emissions, is considered
as a major option to reduce the carbon intensity of electricity generation (e.g., see the review by
Hintermann et al., 2016). However, increasing fuel efficiency may also be an important measure
to simultaneously reduce cost and carbon emissions in the energy sector, as emissions are directly
linked to fuel use. Hence, studying the impact of the EU ETS on the efficiency of fossil fuel power
plants, i.e. choosing inputs to produce a certain output level at minimal cost, allows me to draw
conclusions not only on the effect of carbon pricing on the optimal input combination in electricity
generation, but also on fuel efficiency improvements as a measure to reduce carbon emissions in
the energy sector.
This study employs administrative annual plant-level data from the German statistical offices
on nearly all fossil fuel power plants in Germany from 2003 to 2012 (Research Data Centre of the
Statistical Offices Germany, 2016). The data encompasses on average about 85 percent of fossil
fuel electricity generation in Germany.1 Germany is particularly suitable for this study because of
the size of its energy sector within the EU2 and its electricity generation structure, consisting of
a variety of hard coal, lignite, nuclear, and natural gas power plants as well as renewable energy
installations.
1The remaining 15 percent is generated by power plants for which participation in the administrative survey is
not mandatory. For example, this includes power plants with less than 1 megawatt (MW) bottleneck capacity or
industrial power plants that generate electricity only for self-consumption.
2Carbon emissions of the German energy sector represent around 30 percent of the European Union’s (EU) carbon
emissions in the energy sector.
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I find positive efficiency effects in fuel use, but no statistically significant labour efficiency effect.
An increase in individual carbon cost of one Euro per megawatt hour (MWh) leads on average
to a reduction in fuel input by around 0.4 percent, holding the level of output fixed. To put this
figure into context, at an average European Emission Allowances (EUA) cost of around six Euro
per MWh of electricity and heat generation and assuming a linear effect, the introduction of the
EU ETS has lead to an increase in fuel efficiency of around 2.4 percent on average. The rather
small magnitude of this effect may be driven by two aspects. First, I also find a negative and
statistically significant effect of the EU ETS on utilization of carbon intensive power plants. Lower
utilization would be likely negatively associated with fuel efficiency. This exemplifies that the fuel
efficiency effect must be interpreted as an overall net effect. Second, this magnitude suggests that
rather small scale measures to improve fuel efficiency were implemented. This is consistent with
the finding that the effects on investments in machinery are either statistically insignificant or of
small magnitude as well as with existing case studies on the investment behaviour under the EU
ETS in the German power sector (Hoffmann, 2007; Rogge et al., 2011).
Following Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014), I model the production
function in a Leontief fashion to take into account specific characteristics in the underlying pro-
duction technology for electricity generation. Assuming cost-minimizing behaviour, input demand
functions for fuel and labour are derived taking simultaneity of input and output choices into
account (e.g. Marschak and Andrews, 1944; Griliches and Mairesse, 1995; Olley and Pakes, 1996).
This framework is used to evaluate the impact of the EU ETS on fuel and labour efficiency.
The major identification challenge is that almost all fossil fuel power plants in Germany are subject
to this regulation, facing also the same carbon price. This prevents a comparison of treated and
untreated plants before and after the introduction of the EU ETS to uncover the causal effect of
this policy. However, the EU ETS affects fossil fuel power plants to a different extent depending
on emission factors of the fuel used, individual heat rates (ratio of fuel input to generation of
electricity and heat) and on the price of emission allowances. Thus, I make use of both cross-
sectional and time variation in treatment intensities, i.e. individual carbon cost for electricity and
heat generation of plants, to identify the effect of the EU ETS on fossil fuel power plants.3
Differences in actual measured heat rates are mainly determined by the state of technology
and actual utilization of plants. The technology is determined by investment decisions, i.e. at the
time of construction of the plant as well as retrofitting. Investment decisions are thereby based
on expectations about development of several different factors, which may include, among others,
the structure of the electricity generation sector, future demand and (fuel) cost relationships. The
utilization of plants is determined by the level of demand and the plant’s marginal cost compared
to other (available) plants as well as its maintenance periods. Given these considerations, ETS
intensities based on actual measured heat rates are very likely to be endogenous. This potential
3In the following text, I will use treatment intensity and ETS intensity interchangeably.
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issue is addressed by using a plant-specific measure of ex-ante exposure to carbon prices that relies
on actual individual heat rates achieved on average before the introduction of the EU ETS instead
of annual ETS intensities. Annual values based on this ETS Ex-Ante Exposure start from 0 Euro
per MWh electricity and heat generation (before the introduction of the EU ETS), with the 90th
percentile being 15 Euro per MWh for hard coal, 20 Euro per MWh for lignite, and 6 Euro per
MWh for natural gas power plants, respectively. Identification relies mainly on within fuel type
variation. Within fuel type variation derives from differences in actual achieved heat rates across
plants and EUA price changes over time. Thereby, variation across plants of the same fuel type
accounts for about 30 to 40 percent of differences in individual carbon cost, with the remaining
part resulting from changes over time.
This paper is related to the literature on productivity and efficiency effects from policies and
regulation in the electricity generation sector. These studies focus mainly on the effects of dereg-
ulation on productivity and efficiency (e.g. Knittel, 2002; Fabrizio et al., 2007; Craig and Savage,
2013; Gao and Van Biesebroeck, 2014). Overall, they find some efficiency gains at different stages
of deregulation, e.g. the switch from cost-of-service to incentive regulation (Knittel, 2002) and the
turn to competitive markets in the United States (Fabrizio et al., 2007; Craig and Savage, 2013;
Chan et al., 2017) as well as in China (Gao and Van Biesebroeck, 2014). This study differs from
these papers with respect to the nature of the influence. Deregulation alters the agents’ underlying
objective function, leading to efficiency changes. In the case of carbon pricing, the objective func-
tion remains the same, however, there are (at least) three possible channels through which fossil
fuel power plants are affected. First, a price on carbon emissions raises opportunity costs of low
heat rates and may therefore incentivize efficiency improvements. Linn et al. (2014) have illus-
trated this mechanism through the example of coal price changes. This reaction may also depend
on (differences in) electricity market regulation as pointed out by Fowlie (2010), who finds that
deregulated power plants choose less capital-intensive mitigation measures compared to regulated
or publicly owned plants in case of the US NOx Budget Program. Second, carbon pricing may in-
troduce an additional burden to producers by influencing optimal input combinations. This in turn
can lead to negative productivity effects (Gollop and Roberts, 1983) or to higher marginal and total
cost (Førsund and Granderson, 2013) as in the case of sulphur dioxide emission regulations. More
recently, Zhou and Huang (2016) investigate the effect of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) in the United States on the technical efficiency of power plants. Although they do not find
a direct effect of carbon pricing on technical efficiency of regulated power plants, they investigate
possible spillover effects on unregulated power plants and find a negative effect. Third, there is
evidence that fossil fuel power plants experienced windfall profits from free allocation of emission
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allowances and carbon cost pass-through under the EU ETS (e.g. Sijm et al., 2006). Modelling
results from Pahle et al. (2011) suggest that this could have an effect on investment.4
Which of these effects prevail and the size of the resulting net effect of carbon pricing on fuel
efficiency are ultimately empirical questions. To tackle these, I analyse the experiences made in an
actual introduction of carbon pricing, using administrative micro data on fossil fuel power plants.
Despite a relatively large literature of (ex ante) simulation studies, analyses based on aggregate
data, or qualitative studies, the empirical literature based on micro data investigating the effect of
the EU ETS in the energy sector is still scarce (McGuiness and Ellerman, 2008; Linden et al., 2013;
Chan et al., 2013; Yu, 2013).5 The small number is mainly due to two reasons: lack of detailed micro
data and issues in constructing a reasonable counterfactual situation (see e.g. Martin et al., 2016,
for a recent review). My paper contributes to this strand of literature addressing both challenges.
First, data before the introduction of the EU ETS, especially on fuel input and carbon emissions,
is often not available.6 The data set used in this analysis offers two years of data before the start
of the EU ETS in 2005. This allows me to observe power plants before the start of the treatment
and use actual measured pre-treatment heat rates in my identification strategy. Thus, it enables
me to better isolate the effects actually caused by the EU ETS from other influences.7 Second
and related to the first issue, this paper circumvents the problem of having almost no untreated
group of plants in the energy sector by using differences in plant’s (ex-ante) treatment intensity
for identification. Although this approach to identify effects of comprehensive policies (covering
almost all agents in an economy) is in general not new (e.g. Mian and Sufi, 2012), it has not been
applied to the energy sector and to the analysis of the EU ETS yet.
The paper is structured as follows: Institutional details on the EU ETS and fossil fuel power
plants in Germany are provided in Section 2. Section 3 outlines the empirical model and identifi-
cation strategy. The data is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6
concludes.
2. The EU ETS and Fossil Power Plants
2.1. Institutional Background
In 1997, emission reduction targets for the EU were formulated within the Kyoto Protocol.
The EU decided to introduce a cap-and-trade system to achieve parts of its obligations (see e.g. in
the EU Green Paper published in March 2000). Within a cap-and-trade system, an overall cap on
4Windfall profits may be one reason for different results compared to Adair et al. (2014). They find that compliance
costs for air regulation crowds out investment in heat rates improvements.
5Additionally, there are studies that focus on a variety of sectors, including but not dealing explicitly with the energy
sector (e.g. Commins et al., 2011; Lo¨fgren et al., 2013; Jaraite and Di Maria, 2016).
6Jaraite and Di Maria (2016), Petrick and Wagner (2014), Lo¨schel et al. (2016) and Lutz (2016) are recent exceptions,
where the last three focus solely on the manufacturing sector.
7Although, it would have been desirable to include even more pre-treatment years, this data is not available.
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emissions for regulated entities is set and emission certificates of an equivalent amount are issued
(either by auctioning or free allocation). Regulated entities have to hand in emission certificates in
an amount corresponding to their individual annual emissions. Otherwise, they face a penalty for
non-compliance. Emission certificates can be traded on a secondary market. By trading emission
certificates, marginal abatement costs over regulated entities can be equalized. Thus, the market
price should reflect marginal abatement costs given the cap. The EU ETS was introduced in 2005,
following the adoption of the EU ETS Directive 2003/87/EC in October 2003. It covers almost
11,000 installations in the energy sector, energy-intensive industry as well as commercial aviation
(from 2013 on). Currently, around 45 percent of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions are regulated
under this scheme. The EU ETS is divided into different trading phases. This study encompasses
Phase I (2005-2007) and Phase II (2008-2012).
The power sector has been included in the EU ETS from the beginning and fossil fuel power
plants are in general under regulation of the EU ETS if their rated thermal input is 20 megawatt
(MW) or larger. This applies to almost all fossil fuel power plants in Germany. Emission certifi-
cates in the first two phases were mainly allocated to power plants free of charge based on their
individual historical carbon emissions (“grandfathering”). Average carbon emissions from 2000 to
2002 determined free allocation for Phase I and from 2000 to 2005 for Phase II, respectively. With
the start of Phase III in 2013, in general, this grandfathering scheme ended for power plants.8
2.2. Power Plants in the EU ETS
In electricity generation, several technologies with different characteristics are employed. Given
that electricity cannot be stored economically on a large-scale, supply must always equal demand.
Since demand is rather inelastic in the short-run, but varies over time (e.g. hour of day and season),
supply has to adjust accordingly. This cannot be fulfilled by a single available technology at least-
cost, calling for a mix of several generation technologies with different fixed and variable costs. The
employed technologies also differ along other dimensions: in particular, the fuel that is used for
electricity generation, and heat rates, which are mainly determined by the underlying technology
and vintage.9 This has implications for the emission intensity of the electricity generation, which
varies over individual plants by heat rate and the fuel’s carbon content.
Traditionally, the German power generation sector relies heavily on coal. In the period from
2003 to 2012, hard coal and lignite together accounted for more than 45 percent of total generation,
8As of from 2013, power plants need to buy their emission certificates either at auctions or on the secondary market.
Eight countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) are allowed
to continue free allocation (by a decreasing amount) to power plants until 2019 under Article 10c of the EU ETS
Directive 2009/29/EC.
9For example, gas-fired power plants in Germany have an average efficiency rate - the inverse of heat rate, i.e. (gross)
electricity produced in energy units with one energy unit of fuel used - of around 50 percent, whereas hard coal fired
power plants achieve on average an efficiency rate of around 40 percent (UBA, 2013). But individual heat rates
vary among the specifically used technologies. For example, the efficiency rate for a gas-fired power plant is also
dependent on whether it is a gas turbine (with a typical efficiency rate of about 40 percent) or a combined cycle
gas turbine (CCGT), which additionally uses the waste heat and achieves efficiency rates up to 60 percent.
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with each contributing almost equally. In the course of the nuclear phase-out in Germany starting
in 2000, the share of nuclear generation in total electricity generation dropped from around 30
percent in the beginning of the 2000’s to 15 percent in 2012. Electricity generation from natural
gas-fired power plants from 2003 to 2012 varied from around 10 to 14 percent. This time period
also exhibited a rise in the share of electricity generated by renewable energy sources, starting
from eight percent in 2003 (which was mainly hydro power) to 24 percent in 2012, with wind (8
percent), biomass (6 percent) as well as hydro and solar photovoltaic (each 4 percent) contributing
the most.10
Generated electricity can be sold either at the wholesale market (day-ahead or forward) or via
bilateral trade agreements.11 The day-ahead wholesale market is widely regarded as a reference for
other products (e.g. forward wholesale contracts or bilateral agreements). In this market, plant
owners submit hourly supply curves with prices and quantities. The individual bids are aggregated
at the market level, with each plant being placed within a merit-order according to its bid. In a
uniform price auction, the market price is determined by the intersection of supply and demand.
The individual bidding behaviour12 and the question whether liberalized wholesale electricity
is a competitive or non-competitive market is under ongoing discussion. In a competitive market,
plants would act as price-takers, placing bids at their individual marginal cost and would only
want to produce electricity whenever the market price was higher than or equal to their marginal
cost. When plants do not behave competitively, they try to influence the market price (e.g. by
withholding capacity at a price that lies above or equal to their marginal cost). The popular non-
competitive models for electricity generation are Cournot (e.g. Bushnell et al., 2008) or Supply
Function Competition (e.g. Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Green and Newbery, 1992). In Germany,
installed electricity generation capacity is concentrated to a certain degree: the four largest com-
panies had a share of 58 percent in the German-Austrian market in 2012 (Monopolkommission,
2013). This has raised concerns of potential non-competitive behaviour. The existing evidence of
market power in the German wholesale electricity market is, however, inconclusive and at least
suggests that behaviour is not stable over time. Mu¨sgens (2006) compares wholesale prices with
marginal cost produced by a dispatch model and finds that prices are consistent with competition
from the early 2000 to 2001, but differ from marginal cost estimates from 2001 to 2003. Similarly,
Weigt and von Hirschhausen (2008) find market prices above competitive levels for 2002 to 2006.
However, Mo¨st and Genoese (2009) do not find evidence for non-competitive behaviour for 2006
and neither do Graf and Wozabal (2013) for the period from 2007 to 2010.
10The data used in this paragraph stems from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi,
2016).
11This applies mainly for electricity generated by conventional power plants. Electricity from renewable energy
sources under regulation of the Renewable Energy Sources Act are mainly enjoying priority access to the grid and
are paid a fixed-price per generated unit of electricity (feed-in tariff) or a feed-in premium for a certain time period.
12In the case, in which actual production decisions are made on a higher level (e.g. company), plants do only have
to supply the amount of electricity that is called by the company.
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With the introduction of the EU ETS, regulated power plants, which are mainly fossil fuel
power plants, are obliged to hand in emission certificates of an amount equivalent to their annual
carbon emissions. The emission certificates stem either from free allocation, auctioning, or can be
bought on the secondary market. The EU ETS is expected to impact fossil fuel power plants by
raising marginal production cost and generating windfall profits due to cost pass-through and free
allocation of emission certificates.13 Introducing a carbon price means that emission is now costly
for the plant (even if the emission certificate is allocated for free to the power plant, it represents an
opportunity cost) and thus, the carbon content in the fuel raises input costs for fuel. Dependent
on the emission intensity of the fuel used for electricity generation, this additional cost can be
significant as it is shown in Figure 1 based on data from BAFA (2015a; 2015b), UBA (2013) and
from the European Energy Exchange (EEX).
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Figure 1: Average Fuel and Carbon Cost in Power Generation
Notes: The black bars represent the average fuel cost to generate a megawatt hour electricity in each year from 2003 to 2012
of a hard coal power plant (left panel) and a natural gas power plant (right panel), respectively. The grey bars illustrate
analogously the average carbon cost. Own calculations based on data from BAFA (2015a; 2015b), UBA (2013) and EEX.
Under marginal cost pricing, emission costs are expected to be completely incorporated in the
power plants’ bids, leading to an emission cost pass-through onto the electricity price. However,
demand reactions and non-competitive behaviour could also lead to an incomplete pass-through
of emission costs. The empirical literature on cost pass-through of emission costs within the EU
ETS to wholesale electricity prices in Germany suggests that emission cost are almost completely
incorporated in the bids and passed onto the electricity price. An early study by Sijm et al.
(2008) finds incomplete pass-through rates. While these estimates depend on the relationship
between electricity prices and input prices, it is marginal input cost that matters for cost pass-
through, i.e. taking into account the marginal plant’s emission intensity in addition to carbon prices
13Another impact of the introduction of the EU ETS is the trading of emission certificates. However, since this is
mainly done at the company level (e.g. Heindl and Lutz, 2012) and the energy sector is in general experienced with
(commodity) trading, I abstract from this issue in the following.
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(Hintermann, 2017; Fabra and Reguant, 2014). k Hintermann (2017) finds that in the period from
2010 to 2013, emission costs are on average (almost) completely passed through to the electricity
prices in Germany, with the extent differing by the level of aggregate demand. This is in line with
Fabra and Reguant (2014), who find almost complete pass-through in Spain from 2004 to 2006,
using detailed bid-level data. Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) and Mokinski and Wo¨lfing
(2014) find evidence for asymmetric cost pass-through in 2005 and 2006 to wholesale electricity
prices in Germany. This asymmetric pass-through ends, however, in early 2006 at the same time as
investigations of pricing behaviour by the German competition authority became public (Mokinski
and Wo¨lfing, 2014).
The incorporation of carbon cost and the associated increase in marginal generation costs
affect power plants to a different extent potentially affecting operational decision (McGuiness and
Ellerman, 2008) and fuel substitution (Linden et al., 2013). For the first two years of the EU ETS,
McGuiness and Ellerman (2008) find a positive impact on the utilization of natural gas power
plants in the United Kingdom, whereas coal power plants experienced a lower level of utilization
consistent with the higher carbon costs that these plants have to bear. On the other hand, Linden
et al. (2013) find that fossil fuels even within a plant are replaced by wood in Sweden. However,
this may be a particularity of the Swedish electricity sector and is not (yet) a current practice
in the German electricity sector. Furthermore, it is unclear to which extent this reflects already
existing trends as pre-treatment years are not observed. Commins et al. (2011) observe lower total
factor productivity in the power sector compared to non-regulated sectors after the introduction
of the EU ETS.
The EU ETS might not only affect individual operational decisions but also investment deci-
sions. These include market entry, i.e. building a new power plant and deciding on size (capacity)
and technology (heat rate and fuel type), but also investments in existing plants. For example, heat
rate improvements may be incentivized by raising opportunity costs of inefficient fuel use, which
may be similar to coal price shocks as investigated by Linn et al. (2014). Seifert et al. (2016) find
potential for technical efficiency improvements for power plants in Germany. It has been pointed
out that the electricity sector incurred windfall profits due to cost pass-through and free allocation
(Sijm et al., 2006). Indeed, Chan et al. (2013) find an increase in revenues during 2005 to 2009
after the introduction of the EU ETS. These financial gains may themselves have an effect on in-
vestment decisions (Pahle et al., 2011). However, case studies on the investment behaviour within
the German power sector suggest that the influence of the EU ETS may be limited to small-scale
investments (e.g. Hoffmann, 2007; Rogge et al., 2011). Lo¨fgren et al. (2013) do not find evidence for
an impact of the EU ETS on firm investments in manufacturing and the energy sector in Sweden.
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3. Empirical Model
3.1. Input Demand Functions in Power Generation
Productivity and efficiency in the power generation sector has received attention in the economic
literature before. When it comes to methodology, different approaches exist in the literature. These
differ in particular concerning short-run substitution possibilities between fuel use and other input
factors, such as capital and labour. On the one hand, this substitution can be included by using
a “flexible” functional form for the production function (e.g. Knittel, 2002). On the other hand,
Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014) bring forward the idea of a Leontief
production function, assuming no substitution between fuel use and other input factors in the
short run. They argue that this is a suitable representation of the relationship between physical
inputs and outputs in electricity generation. Electricity cannot be stored economically to a large
extent, hence supply and demand have to meet at every point in time. This means that a plant’s
actual production might not always match its potential generation capacity, but depends on the
level of residual demand for the respective power plant. Residual demand for the individual plant
is determined by overall demand realizations and the structure of the merit-order at each point
in time. Fuel input depends on actual generation decisions, whereas labour and capital are pre-
determined and adjusted to so-called planned or probable output. This approach abstracts from the
question whether competitive or non-competitive behaviour prevails but relies on the assumption
of cost minimization, which should be independent of the (non-)price-taking behaviour in a “non-
regulated” environment (see e.g. Borenstein, 2000).
Given these arguments, I follow the approach of Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Gao and Van Biese-
broeck (2014) and assume a Leontief production function in electricity generation:
QA = min
[
QP (K,L) exp
(
ωA
)
, F (E,ϕ)
]
, (1)
where QA is actual and QP is planned or probable output, which is a function of labour input
L and capital input K.14 The difference between planned and actual output is determined by
a utilization shock ωA. In the second expression, actual output is determined by fuel input E
and an individual- and time-specific term ϕ, which captures for instance differences across plant
technologies or changes in technology over time. Integrating ϕ explicitly in the model is a deviation
from the function specified in Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014) to illustrate
a potential margin for differences in fuel input across time and plants.
14Subscripts for plants and years are dropped for notational convenience within this subsection.
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Plants minimize cost to produce probable output QP by choosing labour L and capital in-
put K subject to a CES production function as in Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014), as well as
acknowledging price of capital R and wage W :
Min
K,L
RK +W L
s.t. QP ≤ (αKρ + (1− α)Lρ) νρ
(2)
Including capital input K and excluding non-fuel expenses as choice variables in the cost mini-
mization framework are other deviations from Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Gao and Van Biesebroeck
(2014). Whereas the first allows to investigate potentially the role of investments, the impact on
non-fuel expenses cannot be analysed as this data is not available.
Solving this problem leads to the following first order condition for labour input:
W = (1− α) ν λ QP
ν−ρ
ν Lρ−1, (3)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier, ν is a parameter related to returns to scale and 1/(1 − ρ) is
the elasticity of substitution. As actual output equals planned output times the utilization shock,
rearranging, substituting probable with actual output, and taking the natural logarithm, leads to
the following labour input demand function:
l = β0 + βq q + βk k + βw w + υ
l, (4)
where βq = (ν−ρ)/(ν (1−ρ)), βw = −1/(1−ρ) and υl is a residual capturing, among other things,
idiosyncratic productivity effects and individual utilization shocks.
As QP (K,L) exp
(
ωA
)
= F (E,ϕ) holds in the optimum, for the derivation of the fuel in-
put demand function, the second part of Equation 1 can be inverted and assuming a log-linear
relationship written in natural logarithms as:
e = F−1
(
qA, ϕ
)
= α0 + αq q + υ
e,
(5)
with υe being the residual of the fuel input demand function, analogously to the labour input
demand function. Furthermore, ϕ is also subsumed in this residual term.
3.2. ETS Intensity and Input Demand
This framework is used to evaluate the impact of the EU ETS on fuel efficiency of fossil fuel
power plants in Germany, i.e. the effect on fuel input given generation output under cost mini-
mization. Furthermore, this framework also allows me to investigate potential effects on labour
efficiency. Almost all fossil fuel power plants in Germany are subject to the EU ETS and face the
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same European-wide carbon price.15 This prevents a clear distinction between treated and un-
treated power plants before and after the introduction of the EU ETS. Despite this fact, the actual
exposure to the EU ETS differs by plant. Thus, I make use of differences in treatment intensity to
identify the effect of the EU ETS on fossil fuel power plants. Assignment of these intensities are,
however, not random but dependent on the plant’s emission factor, the individual heat rate and
the price of emission allowances. This highlights that not only cross-sectional differences between
plants exist, but also that intensities may vary over time due to changes in carbon prices and
individual heat rates. ETS intensity is thereby defined as:
TIit = PCO2,t × ηit × σk | k3 i, (6)
where TIit is the treatment or ETS intensity of plant i in period t, PCO2,t is the price of emission
allowances in period t in Euro per ton CO2, ηit is the heat rate of plant i in period t in MWh
thermal per MWh electric and σk is the emission factor of plant i in ton CO2 per MWh thermal,
varying with fuel type k. Thus, the ETS intensity is expressed in Euro per MWh electricity and
heat generation, varying over plants and years.
To investigate how input efficiency changes with the introduction of the EU ETS, the input
demand functions are augmented by the ETS intensity. Whereas fuel input is assumed to be
a flexible input factor and as such varies with current ETS intensity, labour input is assumed
to be pre-determined and adjusted with respect to probable output. Hence, expectations on ETS
intensity at the time may influence probable output and hence, may matter for labour input instead
of actual ETS intensity. Since expectations are not observable, I use the year-ahead forward prices
in the previous year as a proxy in the empirical model.16
Furthermore, to capture time-constant individual differences across plants as well as changes
over time in general market conditions (such as the rising share of renewable electricity and changes
in demand levels), I include individual and time fixed effects.
The EUA price may provide similar incentives as fuel price changes (see e.g. Linn et al., 2014,
for an example for coal prices). Thus, one might be worried that some potential fuel efficiency
improvements are actually due to changes in fuel prices and might be falsely attributed to the
introduction of the EU ETS. However, variation in fuel prices may be less pronounced than the
change in marginal cost by introduction of the EU ETS. Nonetheless, to address these concerns, I
include a measure of effective fuel prices (FP ) similar to the ETS intensity by multiplying heat rates
by the respective fuel prices for natural gas, hard coal and lignite in the fuel input demand equation.
15I do not observe which power plants are subject to EU ETS regulation since data on rated thermal input is not
available. The results are robust to a sample with a minimum capacity of 20 MW electric. This should exclude all
power plants that do not participate in the EU ETS.
16For the first year of the EU ETS, I have to make use of actual intensity as forward prices are not available. Results
are rather insensitive to using the same intensity measure as for the fuel input equation.
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Thus, the empirical model to be estimated for fuel e and labour l input demand, respectively,
becomes:
eit = α0 + αq qit + αETS TIit + αFP FPit + µi + µt + it, (7)
lit = β0 + βq qit + βk kit + βw wit + βETS Et−1(TIt) + νi + νt + ζit. (8)
The main parameters of interest are αETS and βETS . An increase in carbon cost of one Euro per
MWh electricity and heat generation leads to a change in input demand by (αETS ∗ 100) percent
and (βETS∗100) percent, respectively, holding the level of output fixed. The assumption underlying
this approach is that the EU ETS’s impact is additive in the log-linear relationship and thus, leads
to a shift in the underlying technology, i.e. the relationship between fuel input and electricity
and heat output. Although this structure is the same as in Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Gao and
Van Biesebroeck (2014), the “implicit null hypothesis” (Fabrizio et al., 2007) is different: Whereas
the efficiency effects found in these studies stem from deviations from cost minimization behaviour
before deregulation, in this study, it is a change in the underlying technology, e.g. resulting from
changes in utilization, actual investments in technology, or other measures to improve fuel efficiency
in response to the EU ETS.
3.3. Identification Challenges and Empirical Strategy
To obtain valid estimates of the parameters for the EU ETS effect on fuel use (αETS) and
labour input (βETS), several challenges must be addressed. Due to simultaneous choice of inputs
and outputs, it has been pointed out that the parameter estimates in a production function suffer
from a simultaneity bias preventing identification (e.g. Marschak and Andrews, 1944; Griliches
and Mairesse, 1995). One reason could be idiosyncratic productivity shocks that may influence
input and output choice, but are in general unobserved by the econometrican (e.g. Olley and Pakes,
1996). These issues must also be confronted in an input demand function approach (Fabrizio et al.,
2007; Gao and Van Biesebroeck, 2014). Neglecting this simultaneity bias would lead to inconsistent
estimates of the respective parameters for output (αq and βq).
Furthermore, the assignment of different intensities is not random but depends on carbon prices,
emission factors, and individual heat rates. Whereas carbon prices and emission factors may be
exogenous to the individual plant17, its heat rate is likely to be endogenous as the underlying
technology is (at least in the long run) a choice variable and can be influenced by investment
decisions. A price on carbon emissions represents a cost shock to the individual plant that may
have a similar impact as a shock in fuel prices. For coal power plants, Linn et al. (2014) show
a positive relationship between the individual heat rate and the coal price. Thus, carbon pricing
may provide incentives to invest in heat rates. A further caveat stems from the fact that I do
17The latter may only be reasonable if there is no switching of the main fuel type. The number of reporting plants
within main fuel types is quite stable over time, which lends credibility to this assumption.
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not observe maximum potential heat rates but only actual measured heat rates. Thus, a further
important issue is the simultaneous determination of utilization and the observable heat rate. The
introduction of the EU ETS and a positive carbon price might affect the plant’s place in the
merit-order and hence, its utilization which in turn has consequences for its actual attainable heat
rate.
I make use of two empirical strategies to confront these challenges and provide robust estimates
of the effect of the EU ETS. First, the potential endogeneity of output is addressed by an instru-
mental variable approach following Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014). As
instrumental variables for output, Fabrizio et al. (2007) use state-level electricity consumption and
Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014) use province-level value added and employment in their markets
under study (the United States and China, respectively). Given the structure of the German elec-
tricity market, using regional variation is not sufficient for identification.18 Therefore, I focus on
instruments that hint at the plant’s position in the merit-order. The instrumental variables should
explain the level of individual output but may not be correlated with idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. Therefore, potential instruments for output include twice lagged individual output and
output of other plants (competitors), who have a higher capacity factor.19
Competitor’s output may be potentially endogenous if defined as total output of all plants minus
production of this plant. In this case, output of plants with higher marginal cost would be included
in this measure, although those plant’s are likely to be affected by idiosyncratic productivity shocks
of the respective plant. However, if only the output of competitors with a higher capacity factor
is included, this variable may approximate the position in the merit-order and creates additional
variation across plants due to different capacity factors. In addition to that, it has been pointed
out that lagged individual values could be potential instruments in the context of production
function estimation (e.g. Aguirregabiria, 2009; Alonso-Borrego, 2010). This approach rests on the
implicit assumption of no serial correlation of productivity shocks. Transferring this assumption to
the input demand framework, lagged individual output might not be correlated with idiosyncratic
productivity shocks in the current year, but may hint at the plant’s general place in the merit-order
and thus, have explanatory power for current output.
Second, in order to tackle the potential endogeneity of individual heat rates in the ETS intensity
as well as in the effective fuel price variable, I construct a measure of ex-ante exposure that relies
on average actual achieved heat rates before the introduction of the EU ETS. Thus, ETS Ex-Ante
18Federal state level value added, gross domestic product and electricity consumption do not have enough explanatory
power to be used as an instrumental variable.
19Capacity factors are defined as the ratio of electricity generated by the plant to its generation potential, indicating
the plant’s utilization.
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Exposure (EAE) is defined as the product of the carbon price in period t, emission factor of fuel
type k and the average heat rate in 2003 and 2004 for plant i:
EAEit = Pt × ηi,2003−2004 × σk | k3 i.
For Fuel Price Ex-Ante Exposure (FP EAE) average individual heat rates in 2003 and 2004 are
multiplied by the respective fuel price. This approach is similar to the approach by Mian and
Sufi (2012) who also investigate a program that potentially affects the entire population (Cash
for Clunkers) and make use of different ex-ante intensities. The underlying assumption of this
approach is that plants do not adjust heat rates before the introduction of the EU ETS in response
to its announcement. The EU ETS Directive in October 2003 stated that EU Member States
decide on individual initial plant allocation of emission certificates. The German government
decided in March 2004 on its National Allocation Plan (NAP), opting for grandfathered emission
certificates based on individual emissions from 2000 to 2002 for the first trading phase from 2005
to 2007. Within the NAP, the total amount of emission certificates to be allocated free of charge
for the second trading phase starting in 2008 was already determined. However, it neither defined
whether the certificates would be grandfathered again nor which specific period would be used to
set allocations. In 2006, it was decided to use historical emissions from 2000 to 2005. One concern
could be that free allocation of emission certificates based on historical emissions could provide
incentives to plant owners to increase emissions before the introduction of the EU ETS in order to
increase the amount of grandfathered emission certificates. As electricity cannot be economically
stored to a large amount and supply and demand has to match at each point in time, anticipatory
effects could be expected to affect investments in heat rate improvements. As detailed heat rate
investment data is not available, individual plant investment in machinery in 2003 and 2004 is
used as a proxy. To observe investment behaviour before 2003, I make use of data on aggregated
investments in machinery in the German electricity generation sector from Destatis (2016). This
data is available for the Federal Republic of Germany from 1992 on.20 However, compared to the
sample of fossil fuel power plants at hand, the figures relate to the total electricity generation sector
including also non-fossil fuel power plants.
20Statistics that date back to the 1970’s are only available for the old West German states.
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Figure 2: Investment in Machinery - Energy and Water Industry and Within Sample
Notes: The solid line represents the annual values of the index of investment in machinery (2005 = 100) within the total
electricity generation sector from 1993 until 2014. The index is calculated based on data from Destatis (2016). The dashed
line shows the respective index for fossil fuel power plants in the sample and is calculated based on data from Research Data
Centre of the Statistical Offices Germany (2016).
In Figure 2, the annual investment in machinery in the sample varies more than annual ag-
gregate investment, but the direction of changes is approximately similar. In the aggregate data,
there is a reduction in investment until 2005, with a comparably rather stable period from 2000
until 2004. From 2005 on, investments in machinery increases. These aggregate figures are only
indicative as they might not solely be related to the introduction of the EU ETS, but may be
driven by other factors as well. For instance, Germany liberalized its electricity market in 1998.
Before 1998, power plants were subject to cost-plus regulation, which may have incentivized a high
investment level. This may be one explanation for the reduction in annual investment after this
date. Overall, the aggregate figures do not indicate large changes in investment behaviour in 2003
and 2004 compared to the previous years, and thus, do not lend support to anticipatory effects in
investments.
4. Data
The administrative annual plant-level data on nearly all fossil fuel power plants in Germany from
2003 to 2012 is derived from three different data sets provided by the German Statistical Offices
(Research Data Centre of the Statistical Offices Germany, 2016). The first two are combined in
the annual AFiD Panel Energy Plants and provide information on employment and investment of
energy plants. The third data set used is the monthly report on electricity generating plants with
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a capacity of more than one MW, providing information on capacity, (main) fuel type, electricity
and heat generation as well as fuel input. I only consider plants with their main activity being the
production of electricity as indicated by the respective NACE code.21 Furthermore, I restrict the
sample to fossil fuel power plants, i.e. plants with hard coal, lignite or natural gas as their main
fuel type. The data encompasses on average about 85 percent of fossil fuel electricity generation
in Germany. Labour input is defined as the annual sum of hours worked and wages as the average
labour cost per hour. Capital is approximated by available capacity of the plant in MW. I observe
inputs and outputs in physical units in the generation of electricity and heat. Thus, I can take into
account potential differences in qualities, especially in the energy content of the fuel used. Capacity
factor is calculated as the ratio of net electricity generation to available capacity multiplied by the
number of possible running hours.
The descriptive statistics offered in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 illustrate remarkable variation
across observations. Looking at statistics divided by fuel types suggests that a large part of this
variation originates from differences across the different fuel types. Hard coal and lignite power
plants are in general larger and invest more in machinery than natural gas power plants. As lignite
plants are supposed to be baseload plants, i.e. power plants that provide continuous supply over
the year, they are expected to have the highest capacity factor compared to hard coal and natural
gas. This is also reflected in the descriptive statistics. While hard coal and natural gas have
comparable average capacity factors, the variation within natural gas plants appears to be higher.
This may reflect the larger heterogeneity of technology used by natural gas plants, ranging from
rather simple gas turbines to combined-cycle plants.
21NACE is the “Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community” and similar to the
SIC (“Standard Industrial Classification”).
16
2003
Variable N Mean S.D. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Total
Capacity (MW) 302 184.40 420.14 0.32 1.41 10.81 162.00 564.00
Labour (hours) 95 36,258.04 71,530.87 4,296.17 7,306.33 15,022.42 33,890.75 82,366.00
Fuel use (GJ) 302 870,854.92 2,428,282.50 1,627.67 6,081.67 54,837.04 615,411.00 2,217,797.10
Generation (MWh) 302 104,734.08 243,069.98 289.51 1,294.17 9,104.88 99,694.83 287,949.75
Investment Machinery (EUR) 119 4,438,072.10 9,181,449.40 69,030.00 721,744.00 1,841,129.00 4,497,496.00 12,001,078.00
Capacity Factor 301 0.51 0.34 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.65 0.78
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 318 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
- Only Hard Coal Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 63 362.99 337.68 64.00 86.00 281.00 599.00 720.00
Labour (hours) 24 69,697.70 121,197.34 −a 17,810.88 26,751.96 64,424.96 −a
Fuel use (GJ) 63 1,665,744.30 1,506,800.80 268,894.08 556,595.42 1,345,180.50 2,554,185.70 3,379,462.50
Generation (MWh) 63 205,878.42 162,506.60 43,901.17 73,066.50 176,614.50 305,298.25 377,504.75
Investment Machinery (EUR) 24 9,348,755.00 17,412,229.00 −a 966,372.00 2,568,393.50 12,236,713.00 −a
Capacity Factor 62 0.56 0.21 0.34 0.43 0.56 0.66 0.75
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
- Only Lignite Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 25 788.90 1,048.79 −a 33.50 151.00 1,585.00 −a
Labour (hours) 12 64,327.51 59,035.85 −a 11,199.58 47,726.12 111,460.33 −a
Fuel use (GJ) 25 5,031,284.10 6,536,988.20 −a 184,733.56 1,345,413.30 9,216,955.20 −a
Generation (MWh) 25 512,160.90 618,865.46 −a 26,221.25 167,679.92 1,102,554.60 −a
Investment Machinery (EUR) 17 4,824,437.70 6,318,219.50 −a 1,116,222.00 3,379,536.00 5,693,199.00 −a
Capacity Factor 25 0.67 0.25 −a 0.53 0.77 0.85 −a
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 25 0.00 0.00 −a 0.00 0.00 0.00 −a
- Only Natural Gas Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 214 61.20 157.28 0.20 0.97 3.15 26.00 206.00
Labour (hours) 59 16,946.42 28,312.14 2,882.50 6,090.75 9,297.42 17,781.42 34,560.67
Fuel use (GJ) 214 150,813.98 342,843.17 1,064.33 2,975.75 14,365.83 90,567.58 465,250.33
Generation (MWh) 214 27,361.35 64,249.54 187.70 641.83 2,816.43 19,754.90 87,762.09
Investment Machinery (EUR) 78 2,842,884.90 4,494,614.40 15,011.00 627,081.00 1,572,887.00 2,498,540.00 6,120,308.00
Capacity Factor 214 0.47 0.37 0.12 0.29 0.45 0.62 0.76
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 229 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a Values cannot be displayed due to confidentiality issues.
Table 1: Summary Statistics - Overall and Differentiated by Fuel Type in 2003
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2008
Variable N Mean S.D. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Total
Capacity (MW) 319 180.64 416.71 0.50 1.48 9.78 160.00 588.00
Labour (hours) 117 27,948.65 50,625.27 3,475.25 6,641.25 12,628.33 30,103.92 67,695.00
Fuel use (GJ) 319 783,544.24 2,276,184.30 2,254.00 7,317.33 37,352.17 500,656.68 1,858,684.80
Generation (MWh) 319 94,484.97 230,667.57 488.49 1,570.01 7,649.02 82,878.67 264,339.25
Investment Machinery (EUR) 193 7,945,467.40 38,988,220.00 0.00 20,690.00 572,376.00 2,740,192.00 9,265,957.00
Capacity Factor 319 0.60 0.77 0.18 0.34 0.50 0.67 0.83
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 255 9.39 5.39 5.17 5.56 6.36 11.71 18.99
- Only Hard Coal Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 60 381.52 327.04 64.80 121.85 292.50 624.99 744.50
Labour (hours) 29 50,698.09 84,369.07 −a 16,296.58 22,148.58 42,651.00 −a
Fuel use (GJ) 60 1,541,409.70 1,358,710.20 275,291.80 482,984.42 1,225,356.50 2,361,021.70 3,165,604.30
Generation (MWh) 60 187,521.70 149,530.81 39,658.88 82,961.91 155,135.29 264,993.63 358,855.04
Investment Machinery (EUR) 43 11,903,911.00 37,644,157.00 52,508.00 234,000.00 1,523,775.00 7,806,793.00 25,036,000.00
Capacity Factor 60 0.50 0.13 0.34 0.42 0.50 0.59 0.66
Ex-Ante Exposur (EUR/MWh) 53 15.16 4.05 9.33 11.02 15.87 18.98 19.76
- Only Lignite Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 21 973.26 1,092.56 −a 67.00 732.73 1,787.00 −a
Labour (hours) 14 52,747.71 51,200.44 −a 10,135.08 31,676.92 86,349.67 −a
Fuel use (GJ) 21 5,796,111.60 6,520,650.40 −a 684,657.92 2,202,092.10 11,331,562.00 −a
Generation (MWh) 21 591,987.18 623,915.56 −a 60,450.73 253,646.25 1,175,961.10 −a
Investment Machinery (EUR) 13 59,595,672.00 125,900,000.00 −a 1,301,347.00 1,837,312.00 27,276,994.00 −a
Capacity Factor 21 0.68 0.21 −a 0.47 0.77 0.83 −a
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 20 19.54 5.04 −a 17.76 20.00 23.31 −a
- Only Natural Gas Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 238 60.06 158.59 0.22 1.08 3.18 23.10 178.00
Labour (hours) 74 14,341.62 19,085.83 2,963.33 5,405.33 8,088.38 16,243.75 33,075.00
Fuel use (GJ) 238 150,200.36 359,875.40 1,632.17 5,454.08 14,351.70 90,147.83 424,056.33
Generation (MWh) 238 27,133.08 65,561.86 339.00 1,087.50 2,938.58 18,750.75 79,993.20
Investment Machinery (EUR) 137 1,801,921.80 3,298,937.10 0.00 0.00 370,880.00 1,857,690.00 5,661,971.00
Capacity Factor 238 0.62 0.89 0.16 0.30 0.49 0.67 0.85
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 182 6.59 2.10 5.08 5.37 5.83 6.82 9.67
a Values cannot be displayed due to confidentiality issues.
Table 2: Summary Statistics - Overall and Differentiated by Fuel Type in 2008
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2012
Variable N Mean S.D. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Total
Capacity (MW) 300 218.95 495.55 0.38 1.42 12.95 227.50 683.00
Labour (hours) 106 26,819.04 39,793.99 2,974.50 6,705.67 12,085.04 23,613.08 80,713.25
Fuel use (GJ) 300 824,976.91 2,526,292.30 1,547.43 6,756.71 46,133.24 565,553.83 1,915,334.60
Generation (MWh) 300 99,590.01 258,932.28 335.29 1,401.21 8,312.75 93,976.92 266,181.34
Investment Machinery (EUR) 153 8,393,778.90 27,095,021.00 0.00 135,383.00 992,054.00 4,661,127.00 14,733,845.00
Capacity Factor 300 0.46 0.25 0.12 0.27 0.48 0.65 0.78
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 215 3.11 1.77 1.67 1.81 2.14 3.91 6.16
- Only Hard Coal Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 61 419.21 328.53 78.00 140.00 342.72 661.00 812.00
Labour (hours) 25 36,531.61 35,123.06 −a 14,765.92 22,222.75 40,071.58 −a
Fuel use (GJ) 61 1,497,811.90 1,234,944.30 251,183.38 586,045.08 1,333,275.20 2,124,386.00 2,788,752.00
Generation (MWh) 61 180,805.23 137,137.19 43,667.83 82,594.58 144,117.75 258,738.83 325,759.75
Investment Machinery (EUR) 40 13,174,306.00 40,000,064.00 118,926.00 298,141.00 1,025,623.50 4,420,578.00 30,117,952.00
Capacity Factor 61 0.46 0.15 0.27 0.35 0.48 0.56 0.64
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 50 4.98 1.25 3.19 3.76 5.22 6.10 6.37
- Only Lignite Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 17 1,267.65 1,336.75 −a 164.00 875.00 1,947.25 −a
Labour (hours) 10 69,912.66 46,068.75 −a 27,977.50 65,524.17 114,471.17 −a
Fuel use (GJ) 17 7,298,562.00 7,698,205.00 −a 1,264,260.50 4,690,982.90 11,773,368.00 −a
Generation (MWh) 17 755,217.11 756,285.26 −a 157,373.17 521,879.08 1,238,296.40 −a
Investment Machinery (EUR) 14 21,713,697.00 47,812,867.00 −a 314,229.00 1,196,638.50 13,256,311.00 −a
Capacity Factor 17 0.66 0.18 −a 0.55 0.67 0.77 −a
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 15 6.44 1.75 −a 5.95 6.44 7.89 −a
- Only Natural Gas Power Plants
Capacity (MW) 222 83.62 243.95 0.120 1.17 4.29 39.80 211.00
Labour (hours) 71 17,329.60 35,905.32 2,814.500 5,397.67 8,762.25 14,924.50 34,416.67
Fuel use (GJ) 222 144,373.83 340,922.87 655.333 4,528.17 13,156.42 87,648.06 388,832.12
Generation (MWh) 222 27,068.43 63,442.97 111.611 807.88 2,427.30 16,109.82 83,466.08
Investment Machinery (EUR) 99 4,578,627.90 12,218,751.00 0.000 30,047.00 992,054.00 4,049,328.00 11,325,268.00
Capacity Factor 222 0.45 0.27 0.093 0.23 0.45 0.65 0.79
Ex-Ante Exposure (EUR/MWh) 150 2.15 0.70 1.647 1.75 1.89 2.22 3.16
a Values cannot be displayed due to confidentiality issues.
Table 3: Summary Statistics - Overall and Differentiated by Fuel Type in 2012
One drawback of this dataset is that only the main fuel type of the plant is observed, although
plants may consist of several generating units. In the following, I treat plants according to their
main fuel type under the assumption that the main fuel type has the determining influence on
the plant’s decisions. An additional challenge arises through the matching of different data sets,
i.e. the AFiD Panel Energy Plants and the monthly report on electricity generating plants. The
varying coverage of these data sets results in a large number of missing values for labour input. This
problem is not as severe in the fuel input demand equation since all variables for this equation are
part of the same survey. To overcome concerns that different findings for fuel and labour are driven
by differences in the two samples, I first checked to which extent the two samples are comparable.
The sample with information on labour input represents 60 percent of electricity production of
the full sample. It also differs along other dimensions. Plants with information on labour input
are on average larger (capacity as well as electricity and heat generation) and have a higher ETS
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Ex-Ante Exposure. Average heat rates are, however, rather similar compared to the full sample.
Given these differences, I re-estimate as a robustness check the fuel input demand equation only
for plants that are reporting in both data sets. In addition to that, it appears that there are some
inconsistencies in the reported values as some heat rates would imply efficiency rates (the inverse
of the heat rate) larger than 100 percent. This would violate the law of conservation of energy in
physics as this would imply more energy after the conversion of fuel into electricity. In order to
address this issue, I trim the data set based on heat rate values by the lower and upper 2.5 percent
in the reference specification.22
Furthermore, I complement the data set with information on the year of commissioning, stem-
ming from the German Federal Network Agency (BNetzA, 2014). As plants can consist of various
generating units, there can be different years of commissioning of units within one plant. I have
added the oldest, youngest, and a capacity-weighted average commissioning year to the data set as
a proxy for the plant’s vintage. The data from the Federal Network Agency encompasses all power
plants with a net capacity of larger than or equal to 10 MW. This means that especially smaller
power plants cannot be assigned a year of commissioning. The matching is done by the statistical
offices based on municipality codes, fuel types, and net capacity of the plants.
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure is calculated as indicated in Equation 3.3, using the volume-weighted
annual average of day-ahead daily settlement EUA prices calculated with data from the EEX,
emission factors based on the plant’s main fuel type from UBA (2013) as well as calculated actual
achieved heat rates based on fuel input and plant output in 2003 and 2004 from Research Data
Centre of the Statistical Offices Germany (2016). In the case of the Fuel Price Ex-Ante Exposure
for hard coal, natural gas and lignite, I use the respective individual average heat rates of plants
in 2003 and 2004 and multiply these values by the respective fuel price. For natural gas, I take the
volume-weighted annual cross border price for Germany provided by BAFA (2015b). The annual
fuel price for hard coal stems from BAFA (2015a). Given that there is no trade in lignite, I assume
constant fuel prices for lignite of 0,4 Euro per GJ following BMWi (2014).
22As a robustness check, I also use (a) the whole data set, (b) trimmed by the lower and upper 0.5 percent as well
as (c) dropping all observations with efficiency rates larger than 100 percent. All these robustness checks lead to
results that are consistent with the results in the reference specification.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Annual ETS Ex-Ante Exposure
Notes: This figure consists of four panels showing the distribution of annual ETS Ex-Ante Exposure divided into total (all
technologies pooled) and by main fuel type (hard coal, lignite and natural gas). Each box plot displays the 10th percentile
(bottom dashed line), first quartile (lower solid line), the median (middle solid line), the third quartile (upper solid line) and
the 90th percentile (top dashed line). The 10th and 90th percentile for annual Ex-Ante Exposure of lignite power plants cannot
be displayed due to confidentiality issues. Own calculation based on data from the Research Data Centre of the Statistical
Offices Germany (2016).
The lower solid line of the box in Figure 3 shows the first quartile of the ETS Ex-Ante Exposure,
whereas the middle solid line depicts the median and the upper solid line the third quartile. The
bottom dashed line depicts the 10th percentile, whereas the upper dashed line shows the 90th
percentile.23 The exposure measured in Euro per MWh electricity and heat generation varies
substantially over time, which is due to changes in emission certificate prices. Dividing the ETS
Ex-Ante Exposure by fuel type illustrates that the overall within year variation is not exclusively
due to differences in emission intensity of fuels, but also that the exposure varies across plants of
the same fuel type within a given year. This exemplifies the importance of differences in heat rates
of individual plants for the ex-ante exposure of plants to the EU ETS. In the empirical model, the
identification of the effect of the EU ETS on within plant variation in input demand derives mainly
from within fuel type variation in ETS Ex-Ante Exposure.
The within fuel type variation comes from two sources: changes in the EUA price over time and
variation in average actual measured heat rates in 2003 and 2004 across plants with the same main
fuel type. First, the EUA price varies over time ranging from more than 20 to less than 10 Euro
23Due to confidentiality issues, the minimum and maximum cannot be shown. Furthermore, the 10th and 90th
percentile for Ex-Ante Exposure of lignite power plants cannot be displayed.
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per ton CO2 as can be seen in Figure 4. In general, spot (day-ahead) and forward market prices
evolve in a similar fashion. The largest difference appears in 2007. The low spot price indicates the
lack of shortages of emission certificates at the end of the first trading period in 2007 as banking
of emission permits from Phase I to Phase II was not allowed.
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Figure 4: Development of EUA Spot and Forward Prices
Notes: The dashed line depicts the volume-weighted annual average of day-ahead (spot) daily settlement EUA prices in Euro
per ton CO2. The solid line shows the volume-weighted annual average of forward prices. Calculations are based on data from
the European Energy Exchange (EEX).
Second, Figure 5 depicts the distribution of average actual measured heat rates in 2003 and
2004 over the course of the sample period for all fossil fuel power plants (Total) and divided by
main fuel type. The lower solid line depicts the first quartile, the middle solid line the median and
the upper solid line the third quartile. The top dashed line illustrates the 90th percentile, while
the bottom dashed line shows the 10th percentile. The figure illustrates that even within fuel types
there is large variation in actual measured heat rates across power plants.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Average Actual Measured Heat Rates in 2003 and 2004
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of average actual measured heat rates in 2003 and 2004 pooled over the sample
period for all technologies (total) as well as for the three main fuel type categories (hard coal, lignite and natural gas). Each
box plot displays the 10th percentile (bottom dashed line), first quartile (lower solid line), the median (middle solid line), the
third quartile (upper solid line) and the 90th percentile (top dashed line). Own calculation based on data from Research Data
Centre of the Statistical Offices Germany (2016).
5. Results
5.1. Average Effects on Fuel and Labour Efficiency
The first two columns of Table 4 depict the estimates of parameter αETS in Equation 7, whereas
columns (3) and (4) present the parameter estimates of βETS in Equation 8, with ETS intensity
(TI) replaced by ETS Ex-Ante Exposure (EAE) and effective fuel prices (FP ) by Fuel Price
Ex-Ante Exposure (FP EAE), respectively. For each dependent variable, fuel input or labour
input, two different specifications are estimated. In columns (1) and (3) the twice-lagged variables
of electricity and heat generation are used as instrumental variables for plant output (L.q). The
models are estimated using forward orthogonal deviation transformations to account for individual
fixed effects (Arellano and Bover, 1995). In columns (2) and (4), the output of competitors with a
higher capacity factor is used as an instrument (C.q), and within transformations are employed to
address individual fixed effects. A set of year dummy variables are included in each specification
to control for time fixed effects.
The first stage F-Statistic is larger than the 10 percent Stock-Yogo critical values in the spec-
ifications with competitors’ output and thus, lending support to the relevance of the instrument.
The Arellano-Bond test and the Hansen test both hint at the validity of twice-lagged output as
instruments for individual output.
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Dependent Variable: (1) ln(fuel) (2) ln(fuel) (3) ln(labour) (4) ln(labour)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0019)
First Stage F-Statistic 28.53 32.48
Stock-Yogo critical values (10%) 16.38 16.38
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) p-value 0.009 0.046
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) p-value 0.722 0.362
Hansen test p-value 0.604 0.119
Number of instruments 36 1 36 1
Observations 2,246 2,569 868 994
Instruments L.q C.q L.q C.q
Time Fixed Effects + + + +
Individual Fixed Effects + + + +
Notes: In this table the coefficient of the ETS Ex-Ante Exposure obtained in a regression of fuel input
or labour input on ETS Ex-Ante Exposure, Fuel Price Ex-Ante Exposure, individual electricity and heat
generation, year and individual fixed effects is shown. In the models of labour input in column (3) and
(4), wages and available capacity (capital) are additional explanatory variables. Heat rate values are
trimmed at 2.5/97.5 percent level. The first and the third columns refer to two-step difference GMM
estimation using forward orthogonal deviation transformations. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at the plant level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 4: Average Effects - Fuel and Labour Input
The average effect in Table 4 for the effect on fuel efficiency is around -0.004. The effect is
statistically significant at all conventional levels of significance. In other words, an increase in
individual carbon cost of one Euro per MWh leads to a reduction in input demand by around 0.4
percent on average, holding the level of output fixed. To put this into the context of an average
ETS cost of around six Euro in this sample from 2005 to 2012 and assuming a linear relationship,
this translates into an increase in fuel efficiency by around 2.4 percent that can be attributed to
the introduction of the EU ETS.
Concerning the labour input demand equation, none of the parameter estimates for the ETS
Ex-Ante Exposure are statistically significant. Thus, there is no evidence that the introduction of
the EU ETS had an impact on labour efficiency on average.
Besides average effects over all plants, the size of the effects for individual plants may vary by
main fuel type, size or age. However, I find no evidence of heterogeneous effects with respect to
different fuel types and age categories for neither fuel nor labour efficiency. For larger power plants,
however, the fuel efficiency effects seem to be somewhat smaller.24 This could be an indication that
large power plants are maybe already quite efficient and that there are less small-scale measures
for improvements left that could be implemented.
24The corresponding results as well as the definition of the categories can be found in the appendix.
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5.2. Robustness Checks for Average Fuel Efficiency Results
I do various robustness checks for the fuel input demand equation to assess potential remaining
concerns and challenges with the estimation strategy and the underlying data.
Dependent Variable: ln(fuel) (1) (2) N
1. Forward prices −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ 2,246 (1) / 2,569 (2)
(0.0011) (0.0013)
2. Labour demand sample −0.0034∗∗ −0.0032∗∗ 882 (1) / 1,003 (2)
(0.0009) (0.0015)
3. Sample until 2010 −0.0005 −0.0054∗∗∗ 1,831 (1) / 1,920 (2)
(0.0010) (0.0011)
4. Plants > 20 MW −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ 1,143 (1) / 1,291 (2)
(0.0013) (0.0015)
5. Balanced sample −0.0022∗∗ −0.0032∗∗ 1,460 (1) / 1,626 (2)
(0.0009) (0.0009)
6. Single unit plants −0.0024 −0.0013 633 (1) / 727 (2)
(0.0024) (0.0010)
Explanatory Variable Ex-Ante Exposure Ex-Ante Exposure
Instruments L.q C.q
Time Fixed Effects + +
Individual Fixed Effects + +
Notes: In this table the coefficient of the ETS Ex-Ante Exposure obtained in a regression of fuel
input on ETS Ex-Ante Exposure, Fuel Price Ex-Ante Exposure, individual electricity and heat
generation, year and individual fixed effects is shown. Heat rate values are trimmed at 2.5/97.5
percent level. The first two columns refer to two-step difference GMM estimation using forward
orthogonal deviation transformations. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the plant
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 5: Average Effects - Fuel Input - Robustness Checks
First, Figure 4 hints in general to a similar evolution of spot and forward prices except for the
drop in spot prices at the end of 2007, whereas the forward prices indicate that a higher price is
expected for the following years. However, expected carbon prices may be relevant for deciding to
improve fuel efficiency. Thus, I estimate the fuel input demand equation with an ETS Ex-Ante
Exposure based on forward prices as a proxy for expectations over future carbon prices instead of
spot prices, yielding nearly exact the same results.
Second, an analysis of sample differences between fuel and labour input demand equation reveals
that plants used for estimating the fuel demand equation are different from plants that report labour
data (as mentioned in the data section). In general, the plants reporting labour are larger in terms
of capacity and generation. With regard to different fuel types, a large share of natural gas plants
do not report labour information. The sample of plants with information on labour consistently
display a larger ETS Ex-Ante Exposure. Although, the sample with labour information represents
around 60 percent of fossil fuel electricity generation, one might be concerned that these differences
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in plant characteristics between the samples might be one reason for different findings across the
fuel and labour demand equation. Thus, I estimate the fuel demand equation only for plants that
also report labour data. The results are similar (statistically significant negative estimate for ETS
Ex-Ante Exposure) but of a somewhat lower magnitude.
Third, the energy industry in general but especially in Germany is undergoing significant
changes in recent years. One aspect is the increasing share of electricity generated by renew-
able energy technologies. These technologies may have a significant impact on the energy system
as a whole but also on individual plant efficiencies due to effects on ramping needs (see e.g. Graf
and Marcantonini, 2016). To investigate potential confounding effects I restrict the time period
up until 2010 before the large increases in renewable capacity, especially, wind and solar PV took
place. I find positive efficiency effects with a larger magnitude for the specification using competi-
tor output as an instrument, but no effect in the specification with twice lagged individual output
as instrument.
Fourth, almost all fossil fuel power plants in Germany are subject to the EU ETS. However, I
cannot identify the few plants that are not regulated under the EU ETS since rated thermal input
(the ETS exclusion criterion) cannot be observed in the data. Thus, I may treat some plants as
being regulated even though they are not. To assess the size of this potential bias, I estimate a
specification that only includes plants with an electric capacity of more than 20 MW. This threshold
should be large enough to exclude any unregulated plants. The findings hold also for these “larger”
plants, suggesting that the potential bias is small.
Fifth, the panel used in this analysis is unbalanced. This gives rise to a potential selection
problem, if plants that are least efficient exit the market in reaction to the introduction of the EU
ETS. However, given the structure of the surveys underlying the data used in this paper, plant exit
is unobservable. Plants can stop reporting or do not report in one period but continue in another
one due to changing reporting obligations. Especially plants around the threshold for reporting
duty may report in one period but not in another without leaving the market. As a robustness
check, I only use plants reporting in every time period, i.e. a balanced sample. The results remain
similar, but are lower in magnitude.
Sixth, an interesting case is the differentiation between single and multi generation unit plants.
Whereas the former can only improve the single generation unit to increase fuel efficiency, the
latter have an additional margin: the optimization among different generating units in response to
the EUA price may yield a different fuel efficiency for the overall plant. I check whether the results
of an increase in fuel efficiency still holds for single unit plants as a robustness check. I find that
the effects have a negative sign and are smaller in magnitude, but are not statistically significantly
different from zero any longer. On the one hand, this may underline the importance of having the
additional margin of internal optimization among multiple generation units. On the other hand,
single generating units differ from plants with multi generating units along other dimensions as
well. Plants with multiple generating units are on average larger in terms of capacity, generation
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and fuel input and invest more in machinery. However, the composition of power plants with
respect to the main fuel type is similar for single and multiple generating unit power plants.
5.3. Investment and Utilization
To investigate possible channels through which the identified effects work, I analyse two different
variables that may be affected by the introduction of the EU ETS, namely investment in machinery
and utilization (expressed as the capacity factor). I again use variation in ETS Ex-Ante Exposure
for identification and both equations include the Fuel Price Ex-Ante Exposure. Thus, the model
that I estimate is as follows:
Yit = γ0 + γETS EAEit + γFP (FP EAE)it + τi + τt + ψit, (9)
where Yit is investment in machinery or capacity factor, respectively, of plant i at time t.
Although observed investment in machinery may be more accurate to use than observed total
investment, it does not only contain actual investment in generation units but also includes expenses
for office and business equipment. Such expenditures may also be reflected in the investment data,
which is not as lumpy as might be expected and contains positive values for almost all observations.
To uncover actual investment in generation facilities, I distinguish between these different types of
investment by normalizing the investment amount by the plant’s individual capacity. The kernel
density estimate shown in Figure 6 reveals a bimodal empirical distribution of investments in
machinery normalized by the plant’s capacity in MW and transformed by the natural logarithm.
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Figure 6: Density of investments in machinery per MW capacity (log)
Notes: This figure shows the kernel density function of investments in machinery per MW capacity transformed by the natural
logarithm. Own calculation based on data from Research Data Centre of the Statistical Offices Germany (2016).
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Given this distribution, I assume that investment amounts up to 10 (which is around 22,026
Euro per MW and is approximately at the end of the first hump) are only minor investments,
which do not influence fuel efficiency. Consequently, I set investments in machinery that qualify as
such minor investments equal to zero within an additional specification (column 3 in Table 6).
Dependent Variables: (1) ln(Inv Machinery) (2) ln(Inv Machinery (large)) (3) Utilization
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure 0.0221 0.0288∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0129) (0.0020)
Observations 1,226 1,226 2,577
Time Fixed Effects + + +
Individual Fixed Effects + + +
Notes: In this table the coefficient of the ETS Ex-Ante Exposure obtained in a regression of investments
in machinery or utilization on ETS Ex-Ante Exposure spot, year and individual fixed effects as well
as on Fuel-Price Ex-Ante Exposure is shown. Heat rate values are trimmed at 2.5/97.5 percent level.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the plant level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 6: ETS Effects on Investment in Machinery and on Utilization
As can be seen in Table 6, ETS Ex-Ante Exposure does not appear to have a statistically
significant effect on the level of investment in machinery or only a small positive effect of around
three percent on larger investments. ETS Ex-Ante Exposure leads to a reduction in the individ-
ual capacity factor (utilization). This is consistent with carbon intensive plants experiencing a
steeper increase in their generation cost compared to less carbon intensive plants. This increase
is apparently large enough to induce a change in the merit-order. This is in line with Cullen and
Mansur (2017), who find that low natural gas prices induced by “Shale Revolution” in the US lead
to emission reductions in the US electricity market and present evidence that this observation is
consistent with fuel switching from coal to natural gas power plants.
Overall, the findings suggest that the fuel efficiency effects stem mainly from shifts in utilization,
i.e. among plants in the merit order based on their carbon intensity, and within plant optimization.
Furthermore, there is (weak) evidence for a modest increase in investments into machinery, from
which fuel efficiency improvements may also originate.
6. Conclusion
Understanding the impacts on regulated entities is crucial for the assessment and the further
development of mitigation policies such as emission trading schemes. The introduction of the EU
ETS in 2005 marks the start of the largest cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions
worldwide. In this paper I use the introduction of this policy to contribute to the still scarce
empirical literature based on micro data on the effects of carbon pricing on power plants. Given
the high share of fuel-related cost in total cost in power generation, the introduction of a carbon
price may provide carbon intensive power plants an incentive to improve fuel efficiency. I investigate
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the impact of the EU ETS on fossil fuel power plants in Germany using administrative plant level
data. Thereby, I use variation in carbon cost induced by the introduction of the EU ETS in 2005
and the differential exposure of power plants to carbon prices for identification.
The estimated effects suggest that at average carbon cost of around six Euro per MWh elec-
tricity and heat generation, the EU ETS decreases fuel input by around 2.4 percent, while holding
output fixed. At an annual fuel input of 750 terawatt hour (TWh) and annual carbon emissions
of around 290 million tonnes in hard coal, lignite and natural gas power plants25, on average this
decrease in fuel input is equivalent to a reduction of around seven million tonnes in annual carbon
emissions, using the average emission intensity of fossil fuel use in Germany in 2012. The results
on fuel efficiency are robust to several specifications. However, one specification, using only single
unit generators, suggests that the effects might be driven by power plants with multiple generating
units. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether this means that the effects are originating from
adjustments by within-plant optimization among different generation units or whether it is due to
(unobservable) structural differences between single and multi generation unit power plants.
Furthermore, given the rather small magnitude of effects, the results hint at the implementation
of small-scale and maybe less-capital intensive measures to improve fuel efficiency. This is in line
with the findings of either statistically insignificant or small positive effects on investments in
machinery. Another possible driver of fuel efficiency is the change in utilization. I find that the
ETS negatively impacts the capacity factor, i.e. carbon intensive plants produce less heat and
electricity in relation to their potential output compared to less carbon intensive plants. Thus, the
small effect should be interpreted as a positive net effect on fuel efficiency, exceeding the potential
counteracting negative fuel efficiency effect from decreased utilization of carbon intensive power
plants.
Given the empirical framework, I concentrate on the short term reaction to carbon prices. I
assume that within each period capital (and thereby investment) or labour cannot be substituted
for fuel input. The introduction of a carbon price leads to a change in relative input prices.
If short-run substitution between fuel and labour were important in this context, this should also
have impacted labour demand. Hence, the statistically insignificant effect of the EU ETS on labour
input lends support to the assumptions underlying the Leontief approach. The role of substitution
between capital and fuel use, e.g. by investing in newer technology to improve heat rates, may be a
more prominent driver for fuel efficiency gains in the long run. However, I do not find evidence that
the EU ETS has triggered large investments in machinery even seven years after its introduction.
For the years after 2012, carbon prices have remained low compared to prices in the period of
this study, making it even less likely that adequate incentives may have prevailed to invest in new
technology for fuel efficiency improvements.
25These calculations are based on data from UBA (2013).
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Appendix A Heterogeneous Effects on Fuel and Labour Efficiency
While there are three categories available for fuel types (i.e. hard coal, lignite and natural gas),
I define size and age categories to allow for non-linear effects. The categories are in line with the
empirical distribution and are divided as follows: small (<10 MW), medium (10 to <80 MW),
large (80 to <400 MW) and huge (≥400 MW) for the size as well as new (< 10 years), young (≥ 10
to < 20 years), medium (≥ 20 to < 40 years) and old (≥ 40 years) for age. The different categories
for fuel types and size classes are interacted with the variable of the ETS Ex-Ante Exposure,
respectively.
The effects of the EU ETS on fuel efficiency seems to be quite homogeneous with respect to the
main categories, expect for power plants larger than 80 MW (categories “large” and “huge”). For
these power plants, the fuel efficiency effect of the ETS Ex-Ante Exposure seems to be somewhat
lower in magnitude. As in the case of the average effect in almost all specifications the heterogeneous
effects of the ETS Ex-Ante Exposure on labour input is not statistically significant.
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Dependent Variable: (1) ln(fuel) (2) ln(fuel) (3) ln(labour) (4) ln(labour)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure −0.0145∗∗ −0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0031 0.0060
(0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0080) (0.0090)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure X Medium 0.0026 0.0061 −0.0017 −0.0019
(0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0051)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure X Large 0.0076∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0010
(0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0059)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure X Huge 0.0071∗ 0.0109∗∗ −0.0007 −0.0032
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0060)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure X Young 0.0001 0.0004 0.0033 0.0039∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0019)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure X Medium 0.0008 0.0001 0.0023 0.0015
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0018)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure X Old −0.0096 −0.0124 −0.0108 −0.01143
(0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0070)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure X Lignite 0.0013 0.0023∗ −0.0003 −0.0006
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0026)
ETS Ex-Ante Exposure X Natural Gas −0.0008 −0.0088 0.0055 0.0049
(0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0040)
First Stage F-Statistic 28.31 33.52
Stock-Yogo critical values (10%) 16.38 16.38
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) p-value 0.007 0.067
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) p-value 0.822 0.297
Hansen test p-value 0.669 0.088
Number of instruments 55 1 56 1
Observations 2,246 2,569 868 994
Instruments L.q C.q L.q C.q
Time Fixed Effects + + + +
Individual Fixed Effects + + + +
Notes: In this table the coefficient of the ETS Ex-Ante Exposure and its interaction obtained in a regression
of fuel input or labour input on ETS Ex-Ante Exposure, Fuel Price Ex-Ante Exposure, individual electricity
and heat generation, year and individual fixed effects are shown. In the models of labour input in column
(3) and (4), wages and available capacity (capital) are additional explanatory variables. Heat rate values
are trimmed at 2.5/97.5 percent level. The first column refer to two-step difference GMM estimation using
forward orthogonal deviation transformations. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the plant
level. Size categories are small (<10 MW), medium (10 - <80 MW), large (80 - <400 MW) and huge (400
MW and more). Age categories are new (<10 years), young (10 - <20 years), medium (20 - <40 years) and
old (40 years and more). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 7: Heterogeneous Effects - Fuel
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